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Abstract: Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical 
distinction between the higher and basic levels of organization is supposed, but only a duality of 
modes of access. Moreover, these modes of access are not construed as mere ways of revealing 
intrinsic patterns of organization: They are supposed to be constitutive of them, in Kant’s sense. 
The emergent levels of organization, and the inter-level causations as well, are therefore neither 
illusory nor ontologically real: They are objective in the sense of transcendental epistemology. This 
neo-Kantian approach defuses several paradoxes associated with the concept of downward 
causation, and enables one to make good sense of it independently of any prejudice about the 
existence (or inexistence) of a hierarchy of levels of being. 
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1. Introduction  
Downward causation looks impossible as a concept, but is well established as a fact. A top-
down flux of causation going from an emergent level of processes (say biological or mental) 
to the fundamental level of processes (say physical) that is supposed to underpin it, sounds 
like a paradox. Yet this paradox seems to be forced upon us when we want to make sense of 
many phenomena ranging from psychosomatics to the mutual interaction between organismic 
and cellular life, for instance when we want to express certain facts of experience in which a 
change in our mental state has an immediate impact on our physiological state. My conviction 
is that what is likely to be paradoxical here is neither experience nor even its verbal 
expression in terms of downward causation, but the standard metaphysical interpretations that 
are superimposed onto them. 
The metaphysical conception to be dispelled when downward causation is at stake is a 
dualist and foundationalist picture: a picture according to which downward causation only 
makes sense if there are at least two (ontologically) distinct levels of processes, with their own 
specific entities and properties able to influence each other by way of efficient causality. This 
is also a picture in which, conversely, if there exists only one fundamental level of being and 
process, then the very concept of inter-level causation is pointless. To counterweight this 
popular picture, I will advocate in this article the idea that the phrases ‘downward causation’ 
and ‘upward causation’ are loose ways of describing two modalities of action exerted on a 
process, which nothing prevents one from construing as non-dual. Acting globally (or 
coarsely, at a large scale) yields consequences that can be detected by experiments bearing on 
local levels. Conversely, intervening at the smallest accessible scale yields consequences that 
can be detected by experiments bearing on the larger scale. On the basis of this account, I will 
conclude that: 
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(i) Downward and upward causation are neither illusory nor inherently existent, but 
rather indexed by a certain level of intervention. Accordingly, downward and upward 
causation are not substantial concepts, but rather relational concepts throughout. 
(ii) The relevant relations do not take place between otherwise self-subsistent entities. 
They contribute to the very definition of their terms. These defining relations are 
primarily the relations between the agents and the targets of their actions; and 
secondarily the relations between various domains of acting and experimenting. 
 Point (i) amounts to replacing ontological dualism with functional duality of domains of 
intervention. As for point (ii), it dispels foundationalism from the outset. Instead of the usual 
scheme of intrinsically “basic” and “emergent” levels of being (or levels of organization), one 
is left with flexible levels of (experiential and experimental) access, levels of action, levels of 
analysis, and levels of theorization.  
This strongly anti-foundationalist approach does not fit well with the dominant scientific 
realist program of research in philosophy of science. But it makes perfectly good sense in the 
framework of an alternative program of researchi inspired by Kant’s “transcendental 
idealism,” Husserl’s phenomenology, and pragmatism. After all, in this kind of framework, 
“the access to an object partakes of the being of this object” (Levinas 2001, 161).  
 
2. Paradoxes and difficulties of downward causation 
 
The central difficulty, expressed by Jaegwon Kim (1999), is the threat of vicious circularity. 
Is it coherent, Kim asks, to assume that the presence of a certain lower-level process is 
“responsible” for the presence of a higher-level process, and yet the higher-level process 
somehow exercises a causal influence on the lower-level process? Since the higher level 
entirely arises from the lower level, the idea of downward causation sounds either 
contradictory or redundant. It contradicts the rest of science if it really makes a difference, by 
violating the micro-laws that rule the low-level. And it is redundant if it merely restates in a 
different language, a coarse-grained language, what could, at least in principle, be couched in 
the fine-grained language of the detailed micro-processes.  
Let us dig a little deeper below the surface of the two latter sharp statements. The first 
statement is meant to dismiss the idea of strong emergence, according to which the high-level 
processes are endowed with autonomous causal powers, and with ability to alter the low-level 
processes. It does so by assuming that for high-level processes to count as causal powers in 
the fullest sense, and to be able to alter anything significant in the lower level, they must 
induce a deviation in the laws of the micro-processes. But if this were the case, two common 
presuppositions of the scientific picture of the world would be denied: (a) the presupposition 
of nomological closure of the lower micro-physical level, and (b) the presupposition of causal 
fundamentalism, according to which “macro causal powers supervene on and are determined 
by micro causal powers” (Bedau 20023, 10)). Strong emergence thus apparently amounts to 
an indefensible variety of ontological dualism. 
Now, what about the second statement, which explores the other end of the spectrum of 
positions about emergence? It says that if the higher level makes no real difference, to wit (in 
this framework of thought) if no alteration of the micro-laws is imposed by it, then the very 
concept of a high level and of its causal powers is of no other significance than purely verbal. 
Instead of strong emergence, we are left with nominal emergence, and instead of dualism, the 
flattest possible version of monism: reductionism.  
Kim’s line of argument thus leads us towards an unacceptable alternative: either 
ontological dualism or ontological monism with epiphenomenalism.  
Before I address these central difficulties, I wish to deepen the crisis of downward 
causation by three additional remarks.  
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(1) Since efficient causality seems to be at stake, one is inclined to examine the 
consequences of one of the most popular conceptions of the cause-effect relationship. This 
conception states that for a causal relation to arise, there must be a transfer of some conserved 
quantity (say energy), from the cause to the effect (Salmon 1984). Here, ‘transfer’ must be 
taken literally as: (a) loss of energy on the one side, and (b) gain of energy on the other side. 
But this immediately strikes us as problematic when upward and downward causation are 
concerned, if one embeds them within the framework of elementary physics interpreted with 
substantialist presuppositions. For, if this framework is upheld uncompromisingly, a pattern 
of organization can hardly be said to carry energy by itself, but only qua being made of 
interacting material constituents. This being granted, energy can be transferred from one 
material object to another object (by way of mediators), but not from a set of material 
constituents to their own global organization abstracted from what it organizes.  
(2) According to the same conception, causal relations necessarily involve succession in 
time. Cases of simultaneous causation are shown to be only apparent, since, in view of a 
basic postulate of special relativity, they involve a quick but not instantaneous transfer of 
information and energy (Kistler 1999, 57). Now, it is quite clear that, between an emergent 
level of organization and its alleged physical basis, there is no time-lag (except if one 
considers the progressive onrise of the higher level in history, or the possibility of predicting 
it (Stephan 1998)). Claiming that a set of interacting molecules first causes the biological 
organism to arise (upward causation), and that this biological organism then causes its own 
pattern of chemical reactions to adopt such and such configuration (downward causation), is 
an artifact of our discursive and sequential language. It would be more appropriate to claim 
that the basic elements make up the higher level of organization, at the same time as the 
higher level of organization defines the boundaries of the constituting interactions between the 
basic elements (Emmeche et al. 2000). “Making up” and “defining boundaries” are 
simultaneous, unlike causal relations.  
 (3) The standard idea of emergence is that a certain form, pattern, “topology” or 
“configuration” (Deacon 2003) supervenes on a basis made of the intrinsic properties of the 
components. This model is borrowed from classical physics. For instance, in classical 
electrodynamics, the interaction between N particles (as well as the configuration that arises 
from it) is supervenient on their electric charges and their positions. Within this 
configurational view of emergence, a dual picture of the various levels is automatically 
generated. The lower level is made of substances and properties, whereas the higher level is 
made of pure patterns. Such a duality triggers questions about a possible influence of one 
layer on the other, but the answer to those questions is preempted. Indeed, “upward 
causation” here holds only in the trivial sense of a set of properties determining their network 
of interactions. As for downward causation, it is made implausible by the difference in 
ontological status of the two levels. Figuring out how a configuration may act as such on a 
layer of basic properties is quite problematic. It would be more acceptable, in the spirit of the 
substantialist construal of the basic level, to say that the properties of the constituents 
cooperate to circumscribe their own range of possible variations, than to claim that their 
global configuration causes their alteration. But in this latter case, no motive for supposing a 
duality of levels is left; speaking in terms of mutual causation between these levels becomes 
pointless.  
At this point, one realizes that, in a framework of thought that associates a substantialist 
conception of the basic level and a configurational conception of the emergent levels, talk of 
upward or downward causation is at the same time irresistible and reduced to the status of a 
purely verbal machinery.  
 
3. Partial solutions: The inheritance of Aristotle and Kant 
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Several ideas have been offered to solve some of these difficulties, while sticking (implicitly 
or explicitly) to the substantialist view of the basic level. But, as we will see, they are not 
sufficient to account for the types of experiences and experiments that give support to the 
concept of downward causation. 
The common ground of these ideas consists in using alternative concepts of causality, 
borrowed from Aristotle’s well-known tetrad. The motivation for this attempt is that the 
formerly listed difficulties are connected with some typical features of the concept of efficient 
causality. So why not make use of formal causality, material causality, and even final 
causality?  
It is quite natural, in the standard framework of thought, to consider that the basic 
constituent elements are the material causes of the emergent levels of organization, whereas, 
conversely, these emergent levels act as formal causes which circumscribe a domain of 
variation for the properties of their elements. Upward causation then instantiates the species 
of material causality, and downward causation the species of formal causality. The former 
concepts of “making up” and “defining boundaries” are thereby encompassed within a broad 
class of causal connections (Varela 1976), in spite of their being foreign to efficient causality. 
The concept of formal causation can be developed by borrowing concepts from dynamics: 
the concept of boundary conditions and the concept of an attractor. The higher level of 
organization of a process can be described as a self-imposed boundary condition. Among all 
the possible solutions of the differential equations describing the dynamics of the parts, such a 
boundary condition selects a range of accessible solutions. This substantiates the idea that the 
higher level constrains the evolution of the constituent elements, at the same time as it is 
made up by them. Alternatively, the higher level of organization can be characterized as a 
global attractor for the trajectories of the constituent elements in phase space. This attractor 
shapes out the evolution of the elements at the same time as it is determined by their states 
and interactions (Emmeche 2000).  
The fourth and last species of causality shows up at this point. A two-way process of 
making up and constraining, within an integrated unit called an “organism,” gives rise to the 
appearance of what Kant called “natural purpose” in his Critique of Judgment (§64-66). 
According to Kant, in order for something to be construed as a natural purpose, a crucial 
condition is that “(...) the parts of the thing combine into the unity of the whole because they 
are reciprocally cause and effect of their form” (Kant 1987, 252). Such an integrated process 
can indeed conveniently be thought of as produced by a final cause, insofar as everything in it 
occurs as if the very concept of the organism as a whole were the cause of the distribution of 
its parts.  
In another paragraph, Kant characterizes this reciprocity of action between the parts and 
whole by using a vocabulary that is strikingly close to the current one, yet virtually reverted 
(Kant 1987, 251). In Kant’s terms, a “descending series” is a chain of determination of effects 
by efficient causes. And an “ascending series” is an influence going from the “purpose” of the 
whole process (as conceived by reason), to its constituent “things” (as objectified by 
understanding). The most immediate illustration of this bi-directional circulation of causes is 
human goal-oriented action. A tool is an efficient (“descending”) cause of transformations of 
our environment, whereas our representation of the form of the desired effect is the final 
(“ascending”) cause of our making and using the tool. By a protraction of reason, a natural 
system that does not result from the intention of a concrete agent can nevertheless be thought 
of under the idea of purpose. This is especially the case of living beings (or “organized 
beings”), since “(…) an organized being has within it formative force, and a formative force 
that this being imparts to the kinds of matter that lack it (thereby organizing them)” (Kant 
1987, 253). Organized beings can be considered as imparting an “ascending” (“downward” 
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according to the current lexicon) influence on their material constituents. Their organization 
can be taken as imposing a feedback on what is organized. It can therefore be thought of as if 
it were the final cause of the whole process. A. Weber and F. Varela summarized Kant’s 
lesson by calling autopoiesis (which involves the complete circuit of reciprocal causalities, 
from parts to whole and from whole to parts) a case of “embodied finality” (Weber and 
Varela 2002).  
These conceptions combining material, formal, and final causes provide us with an elegant 
ordering scheme of our conception of parts and wholes. But they should not be taken as 
anything more than that: a satisfaction of our urge for conceptual harmony. Kant himself 
forcefully pointed this out: Final causality, he wrote, only provides our reflective power of 
judgment with a regulative principle (a compelling guiding thread). By contrast, efficient 
causality operates as a constitutive principle (a condition of possibility of objective 
knowledge). Then, unlike the category of efficient causality, which is imposed in advance by 
our understanding in order to constitute objective knowledge, final causes are thought of by 
our reason in order to fulfill a subjective need of systematic unity of knowledge (and are also 
required from our reason by the empirical fact of organismic life).  
At any rate, a combination of material, formal and final causality does not solve all the 
difficulties listed in Section 2. It is still dubious whether stating separately the self-imposed 
boundary conditions and their self-imposing elements, or the global attractor and the self-
organizing constituents, is more than a verbal (or heuristic) device. And we still have to give 
the importance it deserves to the fact that changes at upper levels of organization can trigger 
changes at lower levels.   
The persistence of this list of problems is a challenge that can hardly be addressed unless 
one accepts a minimalist and deflationary conception such as “weak emergence.” Remember 
that defending weak emergence means claiming that “the system’s global behavior derives 
just from the operation of micro-level processes, but that the micro-level interactions are 
interwoven in such a complicated network that the global behavior has no simple 
explanation” (Bedau 20023, XX10). The initial motivation of the conception of weak 
emergence was to indicate a middle way between strong emergence with its dualist flavor, 
and purely nominal emergence in which the higher level is nothing more than an artifact of 
language. But at the end of the day, according to its best supporter, it appears that “weak 
emergence is (nothing but) a proper subset of nominal emergence” (Bedau 20023, X11;X ; 
see Bedau 2008a for a qualification). Weak emergence is the special subset of nominal 
emergence that corresponds to the case where excessive complexity in practice prevents any 
detailed micro-explanation of macro-behavior. If one retains the latter criterion, it may appear 
that in most cases “a weakly emergent property is a limitation of the observer, not a property 
of the system” (Batten 2008). A persistent distinction between weak emergence and flat 
nominal emergence therefore depends on showing how this limitation of the observer can 
sometimes be so extreme that it displays the characteristics of an impassable boundary. This 
may occur whenever the practical limitation in our aptitude to explain macro-behavior is so 
challenging as to acquire a sort of “in principle” status (Bedau 2008b). This may also occur if 
many details of the micro-explanations are irrelevant for accounting for the macro-behavior, 
and if, accordingly, a given macro-explanation can be underpinned by several different micro-
stories (Bedau 20023). 
No genuine (upward or downward) causation, and ontologically little more than nominal 
emergence: This is the disappointing outcome of research developed under a substantialist 
construal of the basic elements. Is there any alternative left? I think there is, provided the 
substantialist presupposition is dropped at every single level of description.  
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In order to identify this way out I wish to proceed with prudence. Let me first step down, in 
the next section, from big metaphysical issues about causality to practical issues about what 
counts as a cause in a laboratory and in everyday life (Bitbol 2007a).  
 
4. An interventionist conception of downward causation 
 
In ordinary circumstances, we are overwhelmed by the number of antecedents that are likely 
to have caused a certain event. Among all these antecedents, the one that we usually consider 
as the cause of this event is either the antecedent that appears to have changed recently, or, 
more convincingly, the one that we can get control of (Mill 1851; Pattee 2000). Control, 
intervention, and action are central touchstones when causes are at stake. This elementary 
criterion for isolating causes then gives rise to a full-blown conception of causality, called the 
“interventionist” theory. According to this theory (Von Wright 1974; Price 1992; Woodward 
2003; Gillies 2005), configuration A is a cause of the distinct configuration B if: (i) whenever 
A has been actively set up by any means, B occurs (with probability p); (ii) whenever A has 
been actively removed, B does not occur (or occurs with probability p’< p). Interestingly 
(Ducheyne 2006), this definition of causality was retained by one of the founders of the 
modern science of nature, Galileo Galilei (1612, 425): “The cause is that which, when posited 
the effect follows, and when removed the effect is removed.” 
We can then speak of “downward causation” in the following circumstances: (i) whenever 
an upper-level antecedent has been actively set up by means of a “coarse” instrument able to 
alter macroscopic patterns, certain elementary phenomena are observed by means of 
experimental devices designed for microscopic analysis; (ii) whenever this upper level 
antecedent has been actively removed by “coarse” instruments, those elementary phenomena 
are not observed. One can define “upward causation” likewise by just inverting the previous 
order of intervention and observation. 
Several difficulties of the concepts of upward and downward causation are formally solved 
by this theory of causality.  
One solution concerns the non-causal (or at least non-efficiently causal) status of 
constraining boundary conditions. Even though the system of mutual constraints or the 
boundary conditions cannot be considered as causes by themselves, an alteration of 
constraints at one level may cause events at another level. For instance, the constraints set by 
the mental state of an individual cannot be said to cause neural and molecular events in the 
body of this individual; it is more reasonable, according to the dynamical conception, to 
consider them as co-extensional. But actively triggering a change in this mental state by 
psychological means may result in changes in her sympathic-parasympathic balance, thus 
giving rise to changes in cell metabolism, increased liability to genetic mutations, or activated 
blood coagulation (Geiser and Halbrecht 2008). If one accepts that causing means altering a 
certain configuration rather than being this configuration, one easily makes sense of such 
psychosomatic phenomena.  
This continues to be true when the putative levels are so intermingled that it looks artificial 
to hold a dualist picture of them. Indeed, each type of intervention can be set up in such a way 
that it (i) concerns specifically and (ii) contributes to defining one level of organization, by 
being more or less coarse-grained and more or less tuned to certain configurations. One can 
then institute a duality of targets for action, in spite of there being no reason to assume an 
ontological duality between the levels, and even no reason to think that questions about what 
levels are “in themselves,” independently of any method of assessment, make sense. The 
difficulty that arose from the tension between a monist conception of natural processes and 
the dualist or pluralist vocabulary of “levels” is thus overcome. 
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The interventionist conception of causality also helps to solve another difficulty, about the 
temporal succession of causes and effects. Even though the evolution of the higher-level 
patterns can be taken as simultaneous with the corresponding lower-level processes, the 
intervention itself is prior to any alteration of the targeted pattern. True, an intervention on the 
macroscopic level does not alter retroactively the micro-conditions from which the macro-
level allegedly arose (which would fall prey to Kim’s accusation of vicious circularity); but it 
can alter the micro-conditions for its future evolution. The difficulty of the apparent 
simultaneity of downward causes and their effects thus disappears. Notice that this solution to 
the time-lag problem formally resembles a proposition of the paradigm of “weak emergence:” 
“(...) A weak macro-cause cannot alter the conditions from which it arose. At most it can alter 
the conditions for its subsequent survival (...)” (Bedau 20023, XX22). However, there is a 
major difference. In the interventionist conception of causation, the verb ‘to alter’ has the 
concrete meaning of a disturbance introduced from outside, a disturbance which contributes 
to defining its own specific target through the scale and “coarseness” of the instrument one 
uses for triggering it. Instead, in the framework of “weak emergence,” the verb ‘to alter’ is 
used only in order to connect verbally two contingent levels of conceptual or computational 
analysis of an otherwise unique dynamical process, which concerns a set of interacting “basic 
elements.” No real influence is supposed to take place between levels of conceptual or 
computational analysis. One can say that a present traffic jam alters the conditions of the 
subsequent motion of the cars that compose it. But, admittedly, in the “weak emergence” 
framework, this is only a way of speaking used in order to compensate for a lack of detailed 
knowledge, and unable to hide the fact that ex hypothesi, all there is is a set of cars that at 
each instant move according to the distance of their immediate neighbors.  
 
5. Interventionist view of downward causation: First objections and replies 
 
As long as one sticks to a substantialist construal of the basic elements, however, the tentative 
solution offered in the previous section is bound to look parochial or anthropocentric. Indeed, 
in this framework of thought, action, intervention, and higher levels of organization as well, 
are all supposed to be derivative when compared to the basic constituents. Accordingly, Von 
Wright’s theory of causality is usually taken as only epistemological, not ontological; it is 
supposed to clarify the way we happen to know causes, not what causes are.  
As for the idea that intervening at a high level of organization may be the genuine cause of 
changes at a lower level, it raises at least two objections. Firstly, it may be replied that saying 
that one has imposed alterations to a given high level of organization is only a way of 
expressing one’s ignorance of the detailed microscopic changes that have been triggered in 
reality. Secondly, it may be argued that the so-called high-level cause of a subsequent change 
at a lower level is at most a releasing cause of this alteration, not its integral physical cause, 
which is likely to involve the entire network of interactions between the basic constituents.  
These objections are easily met within another framework of thought, which I would like 
to characterize as conceptually symmetric. 
The standard conception of emergence is characterized by a twofold asymmetry:  
(i) The usual picture of emergence is asymmetric because it assumes that the basic level 
is made of individual entities, whereas the higher levels are made of structures, or 
patterns.  
(ii) The usual picture of emergence is also asymmetric because it assumes that the 
determinations of the basic level are “properties,” in so far as they are “proper” to, or 
inherent to, the elementary entities, whereas the determinations of the higher levels are 
relative to certain (contingent or necessary) limitations of the cognitive instruments 
used to assess them.  
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But, in view of recent developments of modern physics, both asymmetries appear 
unwarranted in principle.  
On the one hand, in quantum physics, it can hardly be assumed that there is an ultimate 
basic level of processes made of individual little things able to interact with one another 
(Bitbol 1996, 2007b). Setting aside any conceptual trick such as hidden variables, the so-
called elementary particles have to be treated as non-individuals, as mere units of a limited set 
of “sorts,” and thus as formal rather than substantial entities. This becomes even clearer in 
Quantum Field Theory, where cardinals of subsets of particles are in one-to-one 
correspondence with quantized modes of excitation of fields (Teller 1995). Accordingly, 
particles are de facto treated as patterns or configurations, rather than as substantial entities 
(Bickhard and Campbell 2000). The analysis of a level of organization in terms of structures, 
patterns, and topological configurations imposes itself throughout the scale of levels, even at 
the lower accessible level (Campbell and Bickard 2009). The first asymmetry of the standard 
picture disappears thus.  
On the other hand, in quantum physics, one can no longer overlook the fact that 
determinations are exclusively relational or contextual. Here, the cognitive relation cannot be 
taken as merely revealing, but as constitutive. This circumstance pushes the so-called “basis” 
of emergence surprisingly close to the higher levels of organization. The determinations of the 
lower-level entities are just as much relative to certain limitations of the appropriate cognitive 
instruments as those of the higher-level entities. The only difference is that the limitations of 
the cognitive instruments are impassable in micro-physics, whereas they can in principle be 
overcome (notwithstanding complexity) at higher levels of organization. This latter difference 
may explain why it is tempting to privilege microscopic physics, but it does not justify 
forgetting the universality of the mode of definition of attributes relative to a mode of 
experimental access. Once this universality is recognized, the second asymmetry of the usual 
picture disappears too.  
Without any ontological asymmetry, without any stubbornly substantialist construal of the 
so-called “basic” level, the dignity of the interventionist conception of causality is 
dramatically improved. On our construal, it becomes pointless to maintain a distinction 
between epistemological and ontological conceptions of causation, since nowhere can one 
point towards something like an ultimate inherent property that sets the standard of ontology. 
At every level, the cognitive relations and the experimental interventions are constitutive of 
their object and of their target respectively. Therefore, it is not correct to claim that what is 
described as an intervention on a higher level of organization is in reality an intervention on 
its elementary parts. For these putative parts are no more inherently real than the upper levels 
of organization; they are just as much relative to a certain mode of investigation or action as 
these upper levels. At most, one can say that intervening on a high level of organization 
means acting on a domain of cognition that would be analyzed into parts if a microscopic 
mode of intervention were used instead. But this counterfactual statement should not be 
mixed up with an ontological statement about the elementary parts. For the analytic activity 
relative to which the parts are defined is likely to be exclusive of another activity performed at 
an organismic or global level (see the next section for an example of mutual exclusivity).  
 Similarly, it becomes pointless to make a distinction between the releasing cause of a 
certain alteration and the “physical” cause. For, in our symmetric framework of thought, the 
releasing cause is not only triggered but also constituted by an appropriate intervention. And 
the physical (microscopic) cause is evoked only by counterfactual reference to a network of 
factors that could have been constituted by another (possibly incompatible) type of 
intervention.  
 
6. A quantum model of downward causation 
 9 
 
An illustration of this symmetric and interventionist conception of downward causation will 
now be given by examining a familiar quantum mechanical model. The motivation for 
displaying this kind of model is that in standard quantum mechanics, the ideas that 
observables are operationally defined and that experimental interventions are co-constitutive, 
rather than merely revealing of properties, are built into the theory.  
Let us concentrate on the state vector of a two-particle system in which each particle (each 
sub-system) can be submitted to an elementary two-values experiment (such as measurement 
of a component sz of spin 1/2). The possible outcomes of the measurement are labeled + and 
−, and the corresponding eigenstates of observable sz are: ⎮+ 〉 and ⎮− 〉.  
The generic state vector of a two-particle system then takes the form of a linear 
superposition of tensor products of these eigenstates: 
⎮ΨΤ 〉 =
€ 
cij
ij
∑  ⎮i j 〉 = c++⎮++ 〉+ c+−⎮+−〉+ c−+⎮−+ 〉+ c−−⎮−− 〉 
This state vector ⎮ΨΤ 〉 is usually not factorizable. The contributions of the two subsystems 
cannot be set apart; they are said to be “entangled.” According to Schrödinger (1935/1983), 
who first formulated the concept of entanglement, this means that “[b]est possible knowledge 
of a whole does not necessarily include (best possible knowledge of) its parts. (...) The whole 
is in a definite state, the parts taken individually are not” (161) 
A precise way of displaying this type of relation of parts and wholes in quantum mechanics 
consists in comparing different states of the two-particle system taken as a whole, and 
demonstrating that these differences have no counterpart whatsoever in the individual states 
of the sub-systems. 
To show this, let us first consider four mutually orthonormal (entangled) states.  
⎮Ψ+ 〉 =2−1/2 (⎮+−〉+⎮−+〉) 
⎮Ψ− 〉 =2−1/2 (⎮+−〉−⎮−+〉)        (1) 
⎮Φ+ 〉 =2−1/2 (⎮++〉+⎮−−〉) 
⎮Φ− 〉 =2−1/2 (⎮++〉−⎮−−〉) 
These are global states for the two-particle system. But what about the individual states of 
the sub-systems ? These individual states cannot be denoted here by a state vector. At most, 
one may associate each sub-system with a density operator ρ, obtained by taking the partial 
trace of the matrix representing the density operator of the two-particle system. The problem 
is that these individual density operators are exactly identical to each other, irrespective of the 
whole system’s being in any one of the former four states. They always write: 
ρ=1/2(⎮+〉 〈+⎮+⎮−〉 〈−⎮)        (2) 
Therefore, there exists no difference in the states of the parts that may account for the 
difference in the state of the whole (Maudlin,1998). The differences in the state of the whole 
are not supervenient on corresponding differences of the parts. This is one of the most 
remarkable holistic-like features of quantum mechanics among those used by P. Humphreys 
(1997) to develop his conception of strong emergence based on what he called “fusion” of 
micro-properties (Seevinck 2003).  
Another, less documented consequence of entanglement is that any attempt at separating 
completely the states of the parts from the state of the whole is bound to fail. This sounds 
strange, since we have accepted (at least tentatively) that the state of each component particle 
(or sub-system) of a two-particle system can be described separately as a density operator. 
But the latter kind of density operator is quite peculiar: Using the terminology of B. 
d’Espagnat (1989), it corresponds to an improper statistical mixture, not a proper mixture. 
Not all the relevant information about the sub-system is contained in its density operator 
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(obtained by partial tracing). A fraction of this information is missing, and it is contained 
only in the state vector of the overall system. Any separate description of parts, and then any 
dual description of parts and whole, then looks artificial.  
As a consequence, the concept of inter-level causation looks nonsensical in the highly 
holistic domain described by quantum mechanics. Since there is no way to separate the states 
of the parts from the state of the whole, it sounds absurd to call one the cause and the other 
the effect, as if they were two different things. 
Now, even though one cannot separate the contribution of the parts and of the whole within 
an entangled state, there is a sense in which one can intervene selectively either on the parts or 
on the whole. For one can intervene either analytically or globally. Measuring individual 
observables (or preparing sub-systems in eigenstates of such observables) is tantamount to 
intervening on the parts; whereas measuring global observables (or preparing a system in an 
eigenstate of such an observable) is tantamount to intervening on the whole. Thus, measuring 
the component sz of the spin of each particle belonging to a two-particle system means 
intervening on its parts. But preparing this two-particle system in one eigenstate of a global 
observable (in a 4-dimensional Hilbert space) means intervening on its whole. In order to 
display the consequences of this distinction, let me give a new list of eigenstates 
corresponding to an interesting global observable. This list is made of one “singlet” and three 
“triplet” states (Cohen-Tannoudji et al. 2006) : 
(Singlet)  ⎮Ψ− 〉 = 2−1/2 (⎮+−〉 −⎮−+ 〉) 
  ⎧⎮Φ0 〉 =⎮++〉 
(Triplet)  ⎨⎮Ψ+ 〉 = 2−1/2 (⎮+−〉 +⎮−+〉)      (3) 
  ⎩⎮Φ1 〉 =⎮−−〉 
If a two-particle system initially in state ⎮ΨΤ〉 is prepared in state ⎮Ψ−〉 or ⎮Ψ+〉, we can be 
sure that local measurements of the individual observable sz performed on the two sub-
systems will yield one + and one −. And if a two-particle system initially in state ⎮ΨΤ〉 is 
prepared in state ⎮Φ0〉 (respectively. ⎮Φ1〉) we can be sure that local measurements of the 
individual observable sz performed on the two sub-systems will yield two + (resp.ectively  
two −).  
This means that intervening on the whole has effects on values of observables bearing on 
the parts.  
In other terms, preparing a two-particle system in a certain state of a global observable 
amounts to a variety of downward causation, since this determines the distribution of values 
one may subsequently obtain if local observables (such as sz) are measured separately on the 
sub-systems. Global preparation downwardly causes a distribution of values of local 
observables. The converse also holds, of course. If we measure the values of the local 
observables sz on the sub-systems first, and get the outcomes i and j, then by measuring the 
global observable “total spin” one can find the system only in the factorizable state ⎮i j 〉. 
Local measurements here upwardly cause a global state. 
Notice that an intervention on the whole can by no means be identified with a coarse-
grained action that “in reality” bears on the parts. Indeed:  
(i) In standard quantum mechanics, relations with experimental devices are constitutive 
in the strongest sense: They determine generically which observable is concerned 
(global or local), and individually which value of this observable is realized. 
(ii) Global observables and local observables generally do not commute with each other. 
The global observable associated to the list of eigenstates (3) thus does not commute 
with the local observables sz. Therefore, the constitutive act corresponding to 
measurement of a global observable is generally incompatible with the constitutive 
act(s) corresponding to measurement(s) of local observables.  
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(iii) As a consequence of points (i) and (ii), the values of local observables generally 
cannot even be ascribed any counterfactual definiteness when the value of a certain 
global observable is defined and obtained by appropriate measurements. 
According to (iii), the conditions that allow ascription of a global property to a quantum 
system generally exclude the conditions that allow ascription of local properties. If a global 
property is defined and ascribed, it is then wrong to say that there exist underlying local 
properties on which one is acting “in reality.” 
The non-dualist and anti-foundationalist features of this quantum model are obvious at this 
point. Let us recapitulate them:  
(a) The holistic-like character of the state representation of quantum systems makes any 
two-level description of these systems look artificial.  
(b) In this representation, one cannot even use the usual concept of supervenience to 
reconcile the ideas of dependence (of the global level on the local level) and 
autonomy (of the global level with respect to the local level). Indeed, there may exist 
differences between global states without any corresponding differences between the 
local states that are supposed to underpin them. 
(c) Properties and states cannot be treated as preexistent intrinsic features. They must be 
construed as relational. Properties are thus replaced by “values of observables,” in so 
far as they are relative to particular instantiations of measurement acts. 
(d) Experimental interventions simultaneously single out and define a type of property: 
global properties are defined relative to the measurement of large-scale observables, 
and local properties are defined relative to the measurement of low-scale observables. 
The conditions relative to which global observables are defined generally exclude the 
conditions relative to which local observables are defined. 
(e) Upward and downward causation make good sense as soon as one does not pay too 
much attention to state representations, and focuses on the effect of (local or global) 
experimental interventions. Measuring or preparing global observables may influence 
the results of later measurements of local observables, and conversely measuring or 
preparing local observables may influence the results of later measurements of global 
observables. 
Points (a) and (b) dispel dualism of levels, and points (c) and (d) challenge 
foundationalism. As for point (e), it elaborates on the status of downward and upward 
causation in a non-dualist and anti-foundationalist framework. 
 
7. About some possible misunderstandings 
 
The conception of downward causation developed in the previous sections, which we may 
now call the “interventionist-constitutive view,” is unfamiliar enough to trigger 
misunderstandings. The purpose of this section is to dispel some of them.  
The first misinterpretation concerns the role of quantum-mechanical concepts in my 
defense of the interventionist-constitutive view of downward causation. The central argument 
adduced to defend the interventionist theory of causality against the accusation of 
anthropocentrism in Section 5 was borrowed from the philosophy of quantum mechanics, and 
even quantum field theory; but is it really indispensable to rely on such far-fetched and 
allegedly exotic domains of physics? The quantum model presented in Section 6 has features 
that make inter-level causation plausible; but is it representative of more standard cases of 
downward and upward causation? Here are some tentative answers. 
In the argument of Section 5, relying on the philosophy of quantum mechanics seems to be 
a contrived strategy only because one forgets that one is dealing with matters of principle. 
The problem here is whether or not there is in principle a difference between “ontological” 
 12 
causes and a “purely epistemological or anthropological” definition of causality. Claiming 
that there is indeed such a difference presupposes a distinction between: (i) lower levels of 
basic individual constituents where the experimental intervention procedure helps us to reveal 
the true causes identified with micro-properties of individual constituents, and (ii) upper 
levels of organization where the experimental intervention can trigger a chain reaction of real 
micro-causes only by coarse alteration of their global pattern. So, what about the validity of 
this distinction postulated by the view I am criticizing? 
Consideration of intermediate levels is of little help for addressing such a question. Indeed, 
any intermediate entity (such as a molecule, a cell, an organism, etc.) can be seen indifferently 
either as an elementary individual constituent of the upper level of organization, or as a 
pattern emerging from the lower level of organization. Accordingly, an intermediate entity 
can be construed either as an unquestioned (and therefore de facto absolute) elementary 
building block for the upper levels of organization, or as relative to the coarse mode of access 
that singles out its own level of organization. An intermediate entity can also be taken either 
as the real elementary cause of a certain process taking place at some upper level of 
organization, or as a coarse target for interventions meant to trigger events at its own level of 
organization (or at lower levels). In other terms, consideration of intermediate levels can 
display only functional or instrumental asymmetry between basic elements and emergent 
patterns. Intermediate levels present us with no motive to declare that there is a fundamental 
and irreducible difference between: (i) absolute, ontological, efficient causes, and (ii) relative, 
epistemological, releasing causes at higher levels defined (nay constituted) by a scale of 
experimental intervention. Actually, every such intermediate level falls under the second 
(relative, epistemological, releasing) category of causes, and it is only by reference to upper 
levels that one can conventionally (and provisionally) grant it the role of a repository of basic 
entities and real causes.  
The only unshakable reason for taking seriously the distinction between the two types of 
causes, and for accepting that there is a difference of principle between an ontological and a 
purely epistemological-anthropological conception of causes, would then be to have the 
assurance that there exists an ultimate basic level of individual entities endowed with intrinsic 
properties. For, then, these micro-properties would inherently count as real causes, and any 
other higher-level process circumscribed as a target for macroscopic action could give rise 
only to “epistemological” or “relative” releasing causes. Unfortunately (for this way of 
thinking) micro-physics has strong arguments in store against such a concept of an ultimate 
basic level, because, (a) as I mentioned in Section 5, the so-called “elementary” particles are 
replaced by quantum field patterns, and also because (b) not even quantum fields can be 
considered as basic entities, since they all appear (in view of renormalization) to be nothing 
more than “effective fields” for ever deeper levels of field-theoretic entities (Hartmann 2001; 
Castellani 2002). Therefore, at no level, even the deepest and (presumably) most elementary 
level of micro-physics, are there anything like absolute properties and absolute causes to be 
opposed to the (so-called) anthropological, epistemological, relative causes that can be 
defined by varying the scale of intervention on putative antecedents. There is no cause that 
one could consider as a “primary quality” of matter; every cause arises as a “secondary 
quality” in so far as it is relative to a certain procedure of intervention (Menzies and Price 
1993). In the absence of any contrast of this kind even in the putatively ultimate domain of 
micro-physics, the interventionist definition of causes is bound to become paradigmatic in 
principle, not only in practice. 
A second possible misunderstanding is to think that the example developed in Section 6 is 
an exceptional case of downward causation, which works only in the unique epistemological 
configuration of quantum mechanics. This example is in fact less isolated and less exceptional 
than it may appear. Indeed: (i) the epistemological features of quantum mechanics represent 
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only a reinforced version of a universal situation, and (ii) there are some non-quantum cases 
that fully implement these epistemological features in their reinforced version.  
About point (i), even classical physics can be seen as instantiating a type of science that 
only deals with some sort of “secondary qualities” and never with “primary qualities.” This 
was Kant’s interpretation. In his Prolegomena, he insisted that even spatial and kinematic 
predicates can (and should) be considered “secondary” in Locke’s sense (Kant 1955, §13). 
They should be considered secondary because they are relative to the pure form of our 
sensibility. By extension, Kant could have said that ascribing something the status of a 
“substance,” or the status of a “cause,” is also to be considered as “secondary,” because both 
ascriptions are relative to the pure form of our understanding. The strategy of universalization 
of relational/contextual predicates in every domain and at every level can thus already be 
defended in classical science, against the substantialist and foundationalist conceptions which 
underpin reductionist approaches of interlevel relations. This strategy is still used nowadays, 
in the framework of the autopoietic (Maturana and Varela 1980) and “ecological” (Gibson 
1979) theories of cognition, in biosemiotics inspired by Von Uexküll’s theory of Umwelt 
(Hoffmeyer 1997), etc. 
About (ii), it is now increasingly recognized (Lambert et al. 2006; La Mura 2005; 
Atmanspacher et al. 2004) that certain domains of human sciences (economy, psychology of 
perception, rational choice theory, etc.) share exactly the same (and not just analogous) 
characteristics and backbone structure as quantum mechanics. The reason for this strong 
similarity is simple to understand: In all these cases, just as in micro-physics and unlike 
macro-physics, the predicates cannot be disentangled from the methods of access or from the 
agents (Bitbol 2009b). The most basic mathematical structures of quantum theory can then be 
transposed to these domains, including those involved in non-factorizability of state vectors. 
Generalized quantum formalisms able to apply beyond the realm of physics have been 
formulated, and applied with success to several situations in the human sciences 
(Atmanspacher et al. 2002).  
For all these reasons, the quantum case of interventionist-constitutive downward causation 
discussed in Section 6 is likely to have a much higher degree of generality and relevance than 
expected.  
A third misunderstanding may arise about the topic of intra-level causal powers. These 
have just been ignored in this article until now, in favor of a systematic study of inter-level 
causation. Has the interventionist-constitutive conception of causation anything to say about 
intra-level influences? Besides, if (as the interventionist-constitutive conception requires) one 
grants an equal status to high-level intra-level causes and to low-level intra-level causes, isn’t 
there a redundancy of causes? How can one reconcile this equality of status between high-
level and low-level causes with the idea of causal closure of the domain of physics?  
The first question can be answered unambiguously in the positive. The interventionist-
constitutive conception of causation is indeed applicable to the case of intra-level causation. 
For this, it is enough to consider that both the instrument of intervention and the instrument of 
observation are designed for targeting (and thereby co-defining) the same level. The two 
clauses that define an intra-level cause according to the interventionist conception are then the 
following: (i) Whenever an antecedent has been actively set up by means of a level L-specific 
instrument IL+, certain phenomena of level L are observed; (ii) whenever this antecedent has 
been actively removed by another level L-specific instrument IL−, the former phenomena of 
level L are not observed.  
Now, in order to answer the second question, one has to take seriously the word 
‘constitutive’ in the expression ‘interventionist-constitutive conception of causation’; just as 
seriously, in fact, as in Kant’s theory of knowledge. There, the principles of understanding are 
constitutive of objects in so far as they are conditions of possibility (or necessary 
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presuppositions) for organizing “rhapsodies of sensations” into objective knowledge. In our 
case, using the word ‘constitutive’ is meant to express: (i) the relativity of any causal scheme 
to the method of active substitution of antecedent by means of various instruments adapted to 
various scales or levels, (ii) the thesis that, therefore, any causal scheme has these methods 
and instruments as a necessary presupposition, and (iii) the conviction that there is no “fact of 
the matter” as to which of the many instrument-relative causal schemes is more “real” than 
another. No level of organization can claim any privilege for itself, because every such level 
is defined (or “constituted”) by a certain scale of intervention and observation. Moreover, no 
absolute meta-observer, no “view from nowhere,” is available to select one pattern of causes 
at a certain agent-relative level as the “truly efficient” one. This does not threaten the thesis of 
causal closure of the domain of physics, but only denies it any ontological significance. 
Causal closure here means only that it is possible to establish a systematic and self-sufficient 
network of causal connections relative to a single scale of intervention and experimental 
access, without having recourse to any other scale of intervention and access. This being 
granted, causal closure of a low level of organization (say the level of micro-physics) is 
perfectly compatible with the thesis that there are also efficient causes at an upper level of 
organization. Causal closure at one level shows only the efficacy and reasonable 
exhaustiveness of the procedures of intervention and access that define this level, in yielding a 
coherent picture relative to these procedures. Nothing then prevents one from obtaining 
another coherent picture, possibly with causal closure, at another level and with other 
procedures of intervention and access. These two internally coherent pictures and causal 
closures can both be valid, each at its own level, and relative to its own set of procedures of 
intervention and access. Far from being mutually exclusive (as an ontological conception of 
causation would require), they can be made mutually consistent. Of course, mutual 
consistency here does not mean that they are somehow identical, but only that they are inter-
translatable, as if they were two different languages (say a micro- and macro-language). 
For instance, according to the old-fashioned dogma of molecular biology, one can say that: 
(a) A gene causes a phenotypic feature of the cell.  
(b) A DNA strand’s opening offers regions of selective affinities for nucleotide basis, 
RNA polymerase moving along the DNA then causes successive pairing of the 
nucleotide basis of mRNA with the nucleotide basis of DNA (this is called 
“transcription”), and finally mRNA, along with ribosomes and transfer RNA, causes 
systematic pairing with amino-acids thus resulting in a certain protein primary 
structure (this is called “translation”). 
In this standard framework, the biological-genetic causal scheme (a) does not exclude the 
chemical-molecular causal scheme (b), nor conversely; it is compatible with it under certain 
rules of (complete or incomplete) inter-translation. These inter-translatable causally closed 
schemes are not even redundant. Indeed, each one of them is indispensable relative to the 
corresponding procedure of intervention and access. In the framework posited by this 
procedure, it could not be replaced by another causally closed scheme without loss in 
explanatory power. 
 
8. Downward causation beyond present interventions 
 
Another challenge to the interventionist conception must be addressed at this point. Is there a 
sense in which an event at a certain level L can be said to cause an event at the lower level l, 
even in the absence of a present intervention at level L? As we will now see, this question can 
be answered without reference to “causes in themselves,” by studying the mode of 
interconnectedness between domains of knowledge defined relative to different modes of 
access and concepts.  
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L. Bich (2009) recently formulated this strategy, with inspiration from R. Rosen’s (1991) 
concepts of scientific models and relational biology. To begin with, one notices that it looks 
nonsensical to posit real interactions between entities of two models (say a high-level and a 
low-level model) of a certain process, since each model is relative to a completely distinct 
class of modes of access and modes of conceptualization. Figuring out interactions between 
such entities resembles Ryle’s “category mistake.” However, there are special kinds of 
operations that may set the conditions for an indirect comparison between the domains ruled 
by the two types of models. These operations aim at defining entities of the same category, 
yet starting either from the high level or from the low level. These operations are, 
respectively, analysis and synthesis. Analysis is a top-down procedure starting from the 
higher-level system S and trying to figure out its parts (or its “components”). Synthesis is a 
bottom-up procedure which starts from “material elements” (whose concept is derived from a 
model of the basic physical level), and tries to elaborate a model of something like system S 
as the final outcome. In simple linear systems, the “components” obtained as a byproduct of 
analysis, and the material “elements” taken as starting points of synthesis, coincide. But in 
many other cases, this is not true. The model of the whole so to speak imposes a mark on its 
components, making them different from the alleged basic material elements. Downward 
causation is then defined as the non-coincidence of the models that apply to the components 
of a system with the models of its material elements; or as the non-coincidence of the end 
product of the operation of analysis with the starting point of the operation of synthesis.  
Let me give an example, borrowed from quantum chemistry (Hladik 1971; Vemulapalli 
2003; Bensaude-Vincent 2005). If one starts from a quantum model of an isolated atom of 
carbon, one can predict neither its valence nor the geometry of its possible chemical bonds. 
The model of electron distribution of the atom of carbon taken in isolation is indeed: [1s2, 2s2, 
2px1, 2py1, 2pz0] (two electrons on the layer 1s, two electrons on the layer 2s, one electron on 
each of the layers 2px and 2py, and no electron on the layer 2pz). This electron distribution 
entails the di-valence of carbon (because only two electrons are unpaired: those on layers 2px 
and 2py), and an angle between the two predicted bonds equal to 90°. But this is almost 
always wrong. Methane and other molecules including carbon display the tetra-valence of 
carbon atoms, and a tetrahedral geometry with an angle between the bonds close to 109°. In 
view of this huge discrepancy, quantum chemists then introduced the ad hoc trick of “orbital 
hybridization.” The states of the two electrons on layer 2s were linearly combined with the 
states of the electrons on 2px and 2py, and one then obtained four unpaired electrons in 
hybridized states called sp3. This finally accounted for the observed molecular structures. It is 
clear at this point that the physical model of the isolated carbon atom taken as the starting 
point of bottom-up synthesis does not coincide with the chemical model of carbon-
components of molecules that is the end product of top-down analysis. The bottom-up 
elements (2s2 2px1 2py1 - isolated carbons) do not coincide with the top-down components (sp3 
- hybridized carbons). This non-coincidence between bottom-up and top-down procedures 
and associated models accounts for what we may call a case of “downward causation,” 
beyond the situation of an immediate intervention.  
Here again, it is tempting to forget the whole cognitive procedure and jump to the claim 
that ontologically construed molecules have an influence on ontologically construed atoms. 
One could say, for instance, that molecules of methane downwardly influence carbon atoms 
by altering their electron distribution, changing it from the 2s2 2px1 2py1 configuration to the 
sp3 configuration. But this shortcut immediately raises all the objections listed in Section 2. 
By contrast, mere non-coincidence of bottom-up and top-down experimental procedures, and 
of the two corresponding models of the lower level, is immune to these objections formulated 
in an ontological framework. 
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To sum up, according to the interventionist-constitutive view, there is a sense in which an 
event at a certain level L can be said to cause an event at the lower level l, even in the absence 
of a present intervention at level L. This requires only understanding how patterns of 
experimental interventions are used to formulate permanent law-like statements, and 
connecting various access-relative models.  
 
9. Downward self-causation 
 
A crucial question is still left over at this point. We have seen that downward causation makes 
perfectly good sense when an external intervention at a given organization level which is at 
the same time targeted and defined by it, induces alterations observed at a lower level. Now 
what about self-intervening and self-altering? This notion sounds nonsensical. Self-alteration 
looks like a verbal trick for expressing mere unobstructed evolution of a process. However, 
everybody knows cases of (apparent or real) self-interventions in which a voluntary change of 
state of mind has an influence on one’s own physiology (Petitmengin et al. 2006). 
The major sticking point concerns the word ‘voluntary’ in the expression ‘voluntary 
change of one’s own state of mind’. Are we really free to change our state of mind? More 
generally, are we really free to choose any one of our actions (Libet et al. 1999)? Even before 
examining this question, its underlying presupposition must be exposed. The very fact that the 
debate bears on the reality or irreality of free will is a further symptom of the dominance of a 
foundationalist framework. Those who argue in favor of the reality of free will tend to ground 
it on a reified conception of mind. And those who argue against the reality of free will tend to 
reify objective descriptions of physiology and behavior (Bitbol 2008a, b). The latter authors 
are prone to accept that our experience (especially our experience of free will) may be an 
illusion, whereas the law-like objective description of the functioning of our body exposes its 
real working. However, if Kant’s “Copernican revolution” is pushed to its ultimate 
consequences, this kind of cut between experiential illusion and intrinsic reality as disclosed 
by inquiry appears to be an even deeper illusion, generated by reason’s mistaking its own 
horizons of research for metaphysically real entities (Kant 1996).  
An alternative pluralist and access-sensitive analysis of free will is then needed. It develops 
in two steps. Firstly, one dispels carefully the classical dualist view which is inadvertently 
associated with the phrase ‘free will’; to wit the idea that free will means unruly action of a 
substantial mind on another substantial something. Secondly, one formulates a non-dualist 
alternative to this misleading metaphysical picture. An interesting account of this kind, 
adapted from Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason with a touch of Spinozism, relies on the 
dialectic of the actor and the spectator (Beck 1963). The spontaneous belief in free will here 
arises from the standpoint of an actor immersed in nature, whereas denying free will is 
unavoidable from the standpoint of a spectator who undertakes to posit part of this nature as 
an object of description. According to Kant (20021990), even though there can be no 
“theoretical” proof of freedom (i.e., no proof from the standpoint of a spectator), things are 
different from the standpoint of the actor. Indeed, someone “(…) cannot act except under the 
idea of freedom” (247)XX); and this entails that in some sense one is “really free.” One must 
insist at this point on the unusual but sensible reasoning of Kant:  
(i) In order for the very process of deliberation to develop and make sense, actors must 
work under the unquestioned presupposition of free will. As a counterexample, let us 
imagine an actor who decides to do something, but suddenly realizes that, at any rate, 
what she will do next is already pre-determined. This implies a lived performative 
contradiction (Apel 1984) that, if (too) consistently taken into account, may result in 
inhibition of the decision and mere passivity. 
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(ii) This necessary presupposition of free will is enough to declare that actors are “really” 
free from a practical standpoint.  
The fact that, from the standpoint of a scientific external spectator (or even from the 
standpoint of the same human being who has adopted retrospectively a spectator-like stance 
towards her own past actions and experiences), the behavior of the agent may appear to be 
governed by objective deterministic laws does not weaken in the least the practical reality of 
the presupposed freedom. For, here, using the adverb ‘really’ does not require reference to 
anything else than the spontaneously felt, and in practice indispensable, presupposition of 
deliberative action. This sense of the word ‘reality’ can be considered “weak” only if one 
forgets that, in a deliberately non-metaphysical view, no “stronger” an sich sense is available. 
In particular, the theoretical sense of the word ‘reality’ can hardly be considered stronger, 
since it refers only to phenomenal invariants used as practical guides for an intersubjectively 
coordinated research.  
This can be called a “two-stance,” as opposed to a “two-substance,” account of free will: 
actor stance/spectator stance, instead of spiritual substance/material substance. On the basis of 
this account, one could say (in agreement with my initial formulation of the status of 
downward causation) that free will is neither illusory nor inherently existent, but merely 
indexical or situational. It holds in the situation of an actor, qua indexed by this situation.  
In particular, there is indeed a sense in which one: (i) can voluntarily alter one’s own state 
of mind, and (ii) observe the objective physiological “effects” of this voluntary “downward” 
alteration. No “disruption of the laws of nature by a spiritual substance” is needed for that. It 
has only to be accepted that step (i) expresses what is presupposed by oneself as an actor (and 
is then “real in practice”), whereas step (ii) expresses the outcome of an objective science 
developed by adopting the stance of spectators (and is then “real in theory”). 
Finally, one can think of yet another case which is rarely discussed: “indirect self-
influence,” beyond “direct self-causation.” As pointed out by J. Elster, when we wish to alter 
our own (psycho-physiological) state, it is often better to act indirectly by choosing to 
influence ourselves laterally, rather than to act directly by trying to cause the sought state. For 
instance, when we wish to sleep, it is better not to strive towards this aim, but rather influence 
ourselves by promoting other (apparently unrelated) processes, such as concentration on a 
repetitive mental task or renunciation of any aim whatsoever. The altered state thus arises as 
something that is “essentially” an indirect by-product of the promoted process, rather than 
being a direct effect of our desire to reach it.  
It goes without saying that, just as causing, influencing by self-intervening at a certain 
level contributes to defining this level of organization. Accordingly, downward influence 
holds exactly in the same sense as downward causation by external intervention or by 
voluntary self-alteration: it holds qua indexed by a mode of access and a mode of (lateral) 
action. 
 
10. Conclusion and summary  
 
 (1) Making sense of upward and downward causation does not require acceptance of some 
sort of metaphysical distinction between the higher and basic levels of organization: neither a 
substantial distinction as in genuine dualism, nor a distinction between properties and 
structures as in the current popular picture. It is enough to assume a duality of modes of 
access, or modes of intervention.  
(2) If one intervenes at a higher level of organization, some effects of this action can then 
be detected by a mode of access specifically aimed at a lower level. This is downward 
causation. Conversely, if one intervenes at a microscopic level, some effects of this action can 
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then be detected by a mode of access specifically aimed at a higher level of organization. This 
is upward causation. 
(3) The modes of access and the modes of intervention are not just revealing; they are 
constitutive throughout. Accordingly, the levels of organization are not only disclosed but also 
defined by corresponding modes of intervention.  
(4) Therefore, saying that some intervention at a higher level downwardly causes 
alterations detected at a lower level (or, conversely that some intervention at a lower level 
upwardly causes alterations detected at a higher level) is an accurate expression of a dual 
mode of operational definition of the levels.  
(5) The dual mode of operational definition of the levels can be extended beyond the very 
moment of intervention, and beyond the simple case of external interventions, thus also 
making sense of cases of permanent inter-level influence or self-transformation. 
(6) The emergent levels of organization, and the inter-level causations as well, are neither 
illusory nor ontologically real. They are objective in a transcendental, constitutive, sense. 
(7) Alternatively, one can say that the usual dichotomy between epistemology and 
ontology collapses, because we can ascribe no other meaning to the “being” of levels of 
organization and causes than that which has been constituted and objectified by an epistemic 
method of access. 
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